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Abstract 
Society is structured based on the symbol systems that facilitate communication. Humans are 
narrative beings who find their morals and attitudes through interactions with stories that 
describe experience and substance. Symbols used to communicate are the representations of 
narratives attempting to share some meaning. These narratives are open to a plethora of 
interpretations but in order to create a cohesive community leading institutions will push certain 
definitions. By the nature of their hegemony dominant societal classes will control narrative and 
moral understanding to protect their position. The narratological control of these groups props up 
symbols of authority and limits potential attitudes.  Kenneth Burke studies this process in his 
Attitudes Toward History and comes to find that people either exist in an attitude of acceptance 
or rejection towards symbols of authority. This paper looks at how institutions seek to control 
and limit discourse, and the findings bring Burke’s theory into question. The power granted to 
dominant groups by the nature of their hegemony and the central role played by institutions in 
ideological dissemination erases the possibility of a true rejection. As such the attitudes 
presented by Burke as existing in a frame of rejection are more aligned with those that appear 
during transitional periods. Burke’s attitudes of rejection do not actually seek to reject a frame 
but seek to expand it in order to protect against a potential collapse.   
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1. - Introduction  
 
During the past decade it has seemed as if a time of transition was on the horizon for the 
United States if not the world at large. Politics has polarized populations to the point where it 
seems impossible for differing groups to come to an agreement. Countries are divided and each 
side seems to be moving toward their own extreme rather than back toward each other. At some 
point it seems the US is bound for some great change, where things can return to normal, or as 
some might put it when America can be made great again. What is normalcy though, when was 
America ever great? During any time period there always feels like some transition is on the 
way. What the United States is now experiencing might be unique in detail, but overall, what is 
going on is not a new phenomenon. The societal systems currently in place, the institutions that 
support a country, are constantly pushing attitudes among their people. Institutions in the realm 
of this paper are social structures such as government bodies, education systems, enforcement 
agencies, religious organizations, or the media. They are groups that have some form of control 
over the thoughts and actions of a large group of people. Institutions will push attitudes that help 
maintain their position and control, and often these attitudes can be counter to that of other 
institutions or even minority groups within the institution. In order to fully understand the 
polarization taking place today and how to best move forward it is important to first look at the 
systematic forces behind attitudes and the pressures that attempt to shift them. The current 
ideological predicament faced by the United States has not come about by coincidence; it is a 
symptom of how society has organized itself and the hegemony in place. 
Institutions and individuals promote or alter attitudes through their rhetorical output. The 
dialogue surrounding any organization or person has a rhetorical impact based on its persuasive 
qualities. When a government sets its budget, it is sharing with the world and its citizens its 
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values. Their intrinsic credibility and defense of that budget is then an attempt to persuade people 
to share those values. This is a large-scale example that is easy to unpack, but every decision 
made from the grandest of organizations to the lowliest person follows this pattern. It is from 
studying this process, why people make value decisions and how those decisions change, that the 
current situation faced by the US can be made clear. Kenneth Burke was one of the first and 
most important rhetorical scholars to investigate this process. Burke dissected common attitudes 
present among groups of people and how those attitudes relate to frames (intro. ATH). Frames 
are the mindset people exist in that influences how they receive and act on information (4-5 
ATH). Burke explains that people can exist in a frame of acceptance or rejection as it is attached 
to the dominant ideology of the time. As the names entail frames of acceptance support the 
symbols of authority that undergird the dominant ideology and frames of rejection seek to 
oppose and replace them (20-21 ATH). Burke also claims that certain attitudes appear as the 
result of transitionary times when frames of rejection seek to replace frames of acceptance. The 
attitudes that arise during this period seek to subvert the impact of frames of rejection on the 
status quo (27 ATH). Burke comes to these conclusions by studying what he calls the curve of 
history. He takes a macro level approach to see how great ideological shifts take place, and how 
rhetoric changes depending upon what stage in that transition society is in (intro. ATH). Much of 
Burke’s work touches upon societal structures and the impact of their rhetoric but one work, his 
Attitudes Towards History, seeks to answer these questions of frames. Originally published in 
1937 it has stood up extremely well to time. That being said the wide lens approach taken by 
Burke simplifies what truly takes place when opposing frames interact with the dominant 
group’s hegemony over societal narrative. This paper looks to alter the approach taken by Burke 
to see how institutional interactions with individuals might alter Burke’s findings. Burke posits 
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that attitudes can exist in a frame of rejection of the dominant view of the symbols of authority of 
a time. Looking at how institutions seek to control and limit discourse though, brings these 
conclusions into question. The power granted to dominant groups by the nature of their 
hegemony and the central role played by institutions in ideological dissemination erases the 
possibility of a true rejection. As such the attitudes presented by Burke as existing in a frame of 
rejection are more aligned with those that appear during transitional periods. Burke’s attitudes of 
rejection do not actually seek to reject a frame but seek to force an expansion of it in order to 
protect against a potential collapse.   
With all the factors available to the dominant frame to shape thought processes new ideas 
that truly reject the accepted frame cannot come to fruition. Burke describes the curve of history 
as going from Christian Evangelism to Medieval Synthesis to Protestant Transition to Naive 
Capitalism and finally to Emergent Collectivism. He labels each of these periods by the 
dominant frame of acceptance that drove thought during each era. Burke sees a new period 
beginning when the frame of rejection during the rule of the previous frame becomes the 
dominant frame (intro. ATH). By looking at the curve of history on the macro level Burke’s 
ideas of rejection make sense, but when studying the daily interaction of these frames the idea 
begins to fall apart. Ideology certainly is not constant and changes over time, but its change is 
not the result of a framal rejection. Society has been structured by institutions to subdue new 
ideas. Public memory and practices of discipline and punishment seek to assert a single frame 
over society. A dominant ideology is propped up to unify and empower the state. Subduing new 
ideas and limiting identity formation means that for a new frame to gain a following it must be 
founded upon the spiritual factors like a grammar of thought or structure of property relations 
already bureaucratized in the objective and material order of society (112 ATH). Burke’s 
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attitudes within the frame of rejection do seek to alter the dominant symbols of authority, but it is 
misleading to say that they reject these ideas. These attitudes instead could be seen in a similar 
vein to those that appear in what Burke calls transitionary times. When a frame has created an 
outgroup large enough to challenge it, that frame is not replaced instead it is extended to cover 
that group. Ideology is not constant; it is shaped by the casuistic stretching of a frame, but the 
dominant frame is constant because any change will be born out of pre-existing factors. The 
correcting for the faults of these factors is not a rejection of the frame itself it is a continuation. 
In the time periods discussed by Burke symbols of authority came to be redefined, but for the 
most part they all remained. Some hierarchy stayed in place where an in-group ruled over an out-
group. The economic system changed, but people still worked in order to provide for themselves 
and their family. Things change but at the same time they never change by that much. Societal 
change is not based upon rejection but by transitional forces that stretch the dominant frame. The 
dominant frame might come to look very different then how it has previously, but that is the 
result of constant stretching in order to keep what Burke calls the Malthusian limit at bay. The 
structures at place in society make the reaching of this limit impossible. The hegemony exerted 
by the dominant class does not ever allow for the destruction of a frame. Frames must be worn 
away slowly, brought to change as new outgroups come to power and question the accepted 
symbols of authority. This paper seeks to break down the qualities of frames and framal shifts 
discussed by Burke to show that it is impossible to truly reject symbols of authority. Throughout 
this paper many of the terms used by Burke in his description of frames such as symbols of 
authority, the bureaucratization of the imagination, Malthusian limits, and casuistic stretching 
will be defined and explored to show how symbols of authority never really change. Symbol 
systems and their interaction with individuals and society will also be explored to show how the 
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overwhelming control of institutions over these systems prevents new symbols of authority from 
forming. 
This paper takes a theoretical approach to dissecting the work of Kenneth Burke and his 
discussion on framal shifts and changing attitudes towards symbols of authority. This approach 
was chosen because it allows for greater unpacking of Burke’s work itself in order to show its 
incongruity. This work is seeking to prove that the social systems and phenomenon outlined by 
Burke work against his overall argument. The ideas presented by Burke that build up to his 
overall argument could be studied through a more traditional rhetorical analysis based around a 
central artifact, but this approach would have shielded some of the faults in the overall logic. 
Alone the social phenomena outlined by Burke are very apparent and do seem to lead to 
rejection. It is only through studying the pure theoretical nature of these phenomena that the true 
impossibility of rejection on their basis can be discovered. This paper dealt primarily with the 
work of Burke and other primary theoretical sources in order to build an argument supported by 
the problems of Burke’s work alone. Shaping an argument in this manner aligns itself with the 
goal of the paper to show that Burke’s own work is misaligned with itself and therefore 
problematic. Other secondary sources on Burke were unnecessary because Burke himself 
provides the theoretical material necessary for the dissolution of his ultimate point. 
 
2. - Symbol Systems  
Symbol systems are the mechanism by which people communicate. Symbols are the 
embodiment of the personal and societal narratives surrounding the object or idea they represent 
and evolve with the constantly changing conceptions of those objects and ideas. The theory of 
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symbolic action places narrative as the basis for symbolic comprehension. Under this theory, 
narrative can be understood as words or deeds that have sequence and meaning for those who 
live, create, or interpret them (Fisher 2). Narrative is the essential genre for the characterization 
and valuation of human actions and interactions. The selection of a narrative as a means for 
valuation hinges upon the competition between stories by their good reasons (2). Narratives are 
arguments meant to promote values and are selected by shaping the belief in what is moral. An 
unpacking of symbols allows for insight into the interplay between personal and societal 
narratives dictated by what is deemed good or valuable and its impact upon society. How societal 
narratives come to shape personal ones and dominate society provides evidence for how attitudes 
are shaped, and the potential limitations of those attitudes to reject symbols of authority.  
Burke begins his quest to understand human thought by trying to settle upon a definition 
for humankind. He claims that humankind is the symbol-using animal. Burke finds that in 
people's use of symbols a naive verbal realism is clung too in which the role played by 
symbolocity in the crafting of notions of reality is ignored (5 LSA). Substances or ideas can only 
be communicated through symbol systems and this dependence means that all social interaction 
takes place on the symbolic rather than real level. That is not to say that symbols are not real in 
that they do not exist, just that they are crafted by people to represent things in the natural world, 
like a middleman for understanding. Burke finds people cling to a naive realism because symbols 
are viewed as pure representations; yet in reflecting the personal and societal narrative 
surrounding a substance or idea as well as the evolution of these narratives, symbols are far from 
pure forms of reality. Societal narratives form out of the complex interaction between the 
hegemonic ideology and personal beliefs and work to shape personal beliefs towards the 
dominant system within society (6 LSA). Due to this interaction Burke finds that it is not enough 
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to define humankind as the symbol using animal, but that it must also be added that humankind 
is the symbol misusing animal (6 LSA). Just as people come to shape language, so too does 
language come to shape people. This sentiment is echoed by Gabriela Dumbrava in her work. 
She writes that people, by naming all aspects of the world, come to appropriate the world by 
surpassing pure reference and accessing a space of comprehension. Comprehension comes from 
placing symbols into stories that reveal past experiences and beliefs rather than just pure 
perception and this leads into culturalization (252). Culture then can be explained as a 
representative system of values and perceptions made to fit with others (252). Collaboration to 
the point of culturalization is important for the progression of society, but in group formation on 
such a large level also requires a loss of individual narratological control. Humankind misuses 
symbols because instead of using symbols to translate personal narratives, people's personal 
narratives become shaped by culturally accepted symbolic definitions. Fisher argues that it is 
through stories and their reception that morals and values are accrued. As society gains a greater 
control over symbolic definition and symbols continue to be misused dominant societal groups 
gain a greater control over defining what is moral (7-8). This thought is also shared by Hayden 
White who claims the purpose of historical narrative is the moralization of the events it treats 
(18).  Society will push specific narratives and symbolic definitions because maintaining 
cohesion on a large scale requires a code of shared morals and values that come with a socially 
accepted narrative. As society is constantly pulled apart by individual experience and personal 
shapings of events the one factor that can maintain a homogenous grouping of people living 
different lives is shared definition (Burke 55 PC). The need for a strict definition is what makes 
humankind the symbol misusing animal. Predetermined and socially adopted meaning bias 
experience and language to shape human thought. Thought is limited and choice is restrained by 
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how information is delivered and by what is accepted as being rational. How society shapes these 
narratives to be viewed as rational, how symbolic definition is set, explains in part why 
humankind exists in its current form and believes what it does. 
 
3. - Symbols of Authority 
  The leading institutions of a country will shape narrative to support the symbols of 
authority that assist in the maintenance of power and popular acceptance. Narratives in support 
of hegemony attempt to create positive attitudes towards symbols of authority defined by the 
dominant powers. The term, symbols of authority, has come up several times in this paper, but 
what exactly does it mean? Ultimately it is a vague concept; yet they can be understood as the 
representations of the authoritative structure within society. They are a people’s general attitude 
toward any body of control, such as a ruler, court or educator, and the moral slogans linked with 
such (Burke 329 ATH). This might seem broad, and it should because symbols of authority are 
broad and far reaching in societal systems. The moralizing aspect of narrative discussed by 
Fisher and White is directly related to how those narratives value symbols of authority. Fisher 
says that narrative is selected based upon its good reasons, but prior to that a narrative must also 
be rational. What makes a narrative rational is its ability to satisfy the demands of narrative 
probability and fidelity. Essentially a story must be coherent and in the mind of individuals seem 
feasible (2). Narratives must be consistent with other narratives already accepted and this is 
fulfilled by basing new narratives around accepted symbols of authority. 
  The interaction with symbols of authority makes these stories acceptable to people, 
because the same mechanisms are responsible for an individuals' identity formation. G. Mitchell 
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Reyes finds that “individual identities exist by virtue of memories and memories by virtue of 
society” (226). Society introduces one to a way of thinking that restricts identity and symbolic 
definition to something within the public memory. The version of memory society deems 
acceptable for identity formation will be based upon the dominant class’s definition and 
hierarchy of symbols of authority. It is the desire of the dominant class to stay in power, and they 
act accordingly by pushing their own system of understanding upon others. Symbols of authority 
are useful institutional tools because they will limit choice over an adopted group of people. 
Personal experience gives rise to how an individual comprehends their world; yet outside 
pressure on this personal experience such as symbols of authority work to limit the ideological 
range of that comprehension. They come to determine what narratives people find acceptable, 
and as such are the basis for all valuation judgements. The acceptance of one definition of a 
symbol of authority is the acceptance of a strict moral order that prevents certain understanding 
from arising around any narrative. If an institution can spin some moral concept and connect it 
with their own interests the institution can cement its place in society because it is by symbols of 
authority that people come to orient themselves within society.  
   
4. – Orientation 
How people position themselves or are positioned in society is based upon one's attitudes 
towards symbols of authority. How attitudes arise around those symbols comes from a complex 
process of orientation. Burke describes orientation as a method of selecting meaning (5 PC). Ann 
Branaman adds to Burke’s definition when she says that “an orientation is a sense of 
relationships, set of beliefs, or worldview by which humans chart future conduct” (446). The 
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processes of orientation then is the selection of a certain view. Existence as a whole is a series of 
experiences from which people attempt to orient themselves to align with or against a certain 
viewpoint. Burke believes that perspective is decided through a process where meaning or 
assigned definition is selected based upon the definitions relation to the meaning that arises from 
individual experience. Past actions and the remembrance of those actions determine how one 
comprehends the world, and people will gravitate towards societal definitions that are accepting 
of their individual experience. Dumbrava writes that conscience is historically determined, but 
language’s role as the mediator of one's relation with the world leads to the acquisition of a 
degree of freedom within what space one might occupy (252). Institutional control over language 
though limits this degree of freedom. Space or rather orientation is determined through 
interactions with symbols of authority. Based upon personal experience people might be brought 
to attitudes that accept the dominant value hierarchy of symbols of authority or seek to change it. 
Regardless of how one is led to view symbols of authority though, those symbols of authority are 
still the basis of their orientation and any new ideas that might come about. This again is the 
result of narratives need to be rational to be accepted. Narratives for their moral reasoning to be 
accepted must base that reasoning upon the accepted structures represented by symbols of 
authority (Fisher 2). Narratives might seek to alter how symbols of authority are viewed, but the 
necessary connection to them limits the space one might occupy.    
Symbols of authority shape how an experience is interpreted in a variety of ways. One 
way in which the perception of an experience is altered is through the rise of terministic screens. 
Terministic screens are the different filters by which people will understand information based 
upon their experience. Different past experiences will provide different filters that will lead to 
different perceptions between individuals who might be experiencing the exact same thing 
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(Burke 45 LSA). Terministic screens work to prevent understanding between parties by creating 
different representations of reality. Burke finds that the terminology used to describe a situation 
will directly impact the very nature of the observations that arise from it, and since terminology 
is necessary for communication, terministic screens are always present (46 LSA). Terministic 
screens act as roadblocks to communication as terminology will impact each individual 
differently depending upon past experience, but they can also function as means of orientation. 
Terministic screens do not just come about in conversation but will also impact one’s personal 
reading of an experience. They will arise in people’s own narratological crafting of an event out 
of another past experience that would shape their interpretation. Veblen calls this concept trained 
incapacity. He defines trained incapacity as a state of affairs where one’s abilities, resulting from 
experience, function as a blindness (Burke quoting Veblen 7 PC). Burke finds that trained 
incapacities blind one to certain perspectives, and as a result, nudge individuals towards schools 
of thought that fit more within the popular framing of the world (7 PC). By ascribing meaning to 
terminology based on past experience and the promotion of certain societal ideas, terministic 
screens shroud future experiences. New events will be understood through pre-acknowledged 
symbols and confine the discussion of these events to the realm of the terministic screens 
brought about by those symbols. How these new ideas interact with pre-existing screens will 
determine what definitions of the symbols of authority will be accepted and further strengthened 
by encompassing a new idea or altered because they fail to truly represent whatever is 
happening. 
   How does one choose to accept or reject assigned meaning based on how that meaning 
personally affects their life? Burke finds when looking into questions of motives that it is 
important to first understand that people have a deep desire to avoid unsatisfactory situations (9 
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PC). He bases this premise on what he calls the pleasure principle, which is the idea that signs of 
experience are characterized with reference to pleasant and unpleasant expectancies (21 PC). 
Grouping of the world into this binary wipes out the possibility of individual interpretations 
within the spectrum of pleasant and unpleasant and leads to what Burke describes as a faulty 
selection of means due to a faulty theory of causal relationships (9 PC). People tend to gravitate 
towards the pleasant because humankind's orientation schema is based upon serviceability. Often 
the things deemed as good are those things that are most useful to one’s way of life and the 
maintenance of their own interests, and in this way moral goodness becomes linked to 
serviceability (21 PC). Narratives are selected based upon their good reasons; yet, if these 
reasons are really related to serviceability then narratives are selected based upon which is most 
beneficial. Symbols of authority gain and maintain power because of their connection to 
individual interest. The rejection of the dominant interpretation of a symbol of authority is the 
rejection of the current way of life and with that comes significant loss. Using currency as an 
example of a symbol of authority, its rejection would reshape all of society. The entire 
transactionary process of the capitalist system would collapse, and the great potential for material 
gain granted to the supporters of the system would disappear. Although it is not impossible, the 
loss associated with denouncing currency would certainly not be considered serviceable to most. 
People who have been working their entire lives to earn something that they have been told has 
value and that they have seen the value of are going to struggle to give that up even for the 
promise of a better life to come. Currency became so entrenched in society because narratives 
were shaped to assign it value that led people to support it with good reasons. The moral 
grounding of capitalism could be understood to have derived from the benefits money gave to 
the powerful and their attempt to maintain that system. Symbols of authority will be accepted or 
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rejected based upon their serviceability. The more serviceable a narrative, the more benefits 
associated with its acceptance, the more entrenched it becomes in society.  
 
5. - Attitudes of Acceptance  
Decisions of acceptance and rejection happen at all levels of society and are responsible 
for how symbols of authority are defined and how society will be structured at any given time. 
The mechanisms for orientation within symbol systems are structured to push people into one of 
two attitudes in society, that of acceptance or rejection of the dominant frames definition of 
symbols of authority. For Burke, a frame is much the same as a paradigm, and he studies the 
interaction between frames of acceptance and rejection much like Thomas Kuhn studies 
paradigm shifts in science. For Kuhn, a paradigm is one’s current view of the world, their beliefs, 
their morals and their imagination. The fact that he finds evidence of these in science is evidence 
of how widespread an impact frames have on society. Science is considered the realm of 
analytical reason, of hypothesis testing and experiment, yet Kuhn still finds that paradigm plays a 
major role in how science is practiced regardless of how unbiased the scientific method is 
presumed to be. Burke on the other hand studies frames through the lens of literature. He argues 
that each of the major poetic categories is representative of an attitude towards the dominant 
perspective of the symbols of authority of a time (34 ATH). Literary forms are expressive of the 
different attitudes towards symbols of authority because they can be considered what Burke calls 
“recordings on the dial” of culture. They are culture and the mindset of a time written down, and 
as such make for an accessible tool to break down thought and its formation in society ( intro. 
ATH). Dumbrava supports this view. She finds that literature is the most authentic way of 
appropriating the world (252). Text and culture are both formed by memory and meant to 
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preserve what is meaningful to human experience (258). Burke studies the poetics because they 
are metaphors for how attitudes are symbolized in society, and he is looking to understand how 
frames come about and change over the curve of history. 
5.1. – Epic 
Burke outlines three poetic categories that fall within the frame of acceptance: the epic, 
the tragedy, and the comedy. Burke sees the epic as the most archaic of the poetic categories. He 
believes this to be deliberate as the epic’s archaic nature might suggest some emphasis on 
appealing to people's sense of nostalgia (34 ATH). An attitude of the epic, according to Burke, is 
designed to make people feel at home in their current condition, and an appeal to nostalgia is a 
powerful way of achieving this. The epic often is based around a central heroic figure that one is 
meant to identify with. This identification comes from what Burke finds as a general tendency 
towards identification between people and a personal symbol of authority such as an epic hero 
(77 ATH). The role of the epic hero is to lend dignity to the necessities of life through one's 
identification with him or her. Societal attitudes will often adopt the epic hero for this very 
purpose. One such instance can be found in the dialogue surrounding soldiers in America. 
Soldiers are heroes; they go where duty takes them and serve their country to protect the citizens 
who stay behind. At the same time anyone can be a soldier, and everyone knows at least one 
soldier, which makes them easy to identify with. A soldier is not responsible for the ideological 
reason that brought about war. They are just considered honorable for giving their lives to protect 
those ideals and as such lend dignity to the overall conversation surrounding war. War itself 
becomes a thing of honor as it is what allows soldiers to truly demonstrate their bravery and 
patriotism. The epic hero as a device allows institutions to spin divisive topics such as war into a 
positive and more acceptable light by changing the focus of war to an identifiable figure. An epic 
21 
 
attitude romanticizes the hard realities of the dominant symbols of authority to greater 
indoctrinate the populace into the frame of acceptance. The attitude humbles those holding it to 
share the worth of the hero and as a result pushes one to accept and wish to protect society as the 
hero does (35 ATH). It leads people to accept symbols of authority as the hero does to find the 
same comfort and acceptance the hero has achieved by doing the same.  
It should not be considered random that soldiers have so often been put in the role of the 
epic hero in both literature and society. Soldiers, as told by Michel Foucault, are the ultimate 
product of disciplinary practice. At the start of any army career is a long process of training, 
meant to tear soldiers down and slowly reform and rebuild them as efficient tools of war. 
Soldiers are not just taught how to survive in battle during training. Disciplinary actions, such as 
standing in rank or recognizing the chain of command, are implemented to teach soldiers the 
proper hierarchy, to form individuals into a unit brought together by their unquestioning 
acceptance of commands. Coming out against this order is punished, which reinforces the 
process in some or removes others who cannot assimilate altogether (160). Disciplinary systems 
shape soldiers to accept an ideological system and make them into the protectors of that system. 
Crafting a narrative around the soldier as an epic hero leads to the acceptance of that hero and 
their beliefs. Armies are a symbol of authority that protect the ideological forces that birthed 
them. To maintain that symbol, institutions are incentivized to cultivate positive images of the 
army, which is easily done through identification with soldiers.  
An attitude of the epic not only romanticizes societal hardships but also resigns one to 
them. Burke points out that the epic hero is always flawed in some way to allow for 
identification and resignation in an audience. It is impossible to identify with a perfect being. 
Creating visible flaws in a hero makes them realistic and approachable and allows one to better 
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identify with the hero. Identification with the hero by way of their flaws invites one to seek these 
flaws within themselves, which Burke claims promotes an attitude of resignation (35 ATH). An 
epic attitude leads one to dismiss the hardships associated with the symbols of authority that 
might be set aside by another and accept these flaws as a part of life regardless of frame. The 
epic hero cannot overcome society's downfalls; instead they must become at home in them. One 
is brought to accept the symbols of authority because, like the epic hero, that is seemingly the 
only valid option presented to them if they hope to succeed in society and be a hero themself.  
The sentiment of resignation crafted from the epic hero is one also found by Kuhn when 
looking at paradigms in science. When new paradigms emerge in science, they are not 
immediately accepted. Paradigms will be accepted or rejected in the realm of science by the 
process of probabilistic verification. Although frames alter one’s view of the world they do not 
change the world itself, and the problems faced by one paradigm will be faced by the next as 
well. Paradigms shift when one paradigm can answer questions the current paradigm is unable to 
answer (145). Just as with Fisher and the narrative paradigm, Kuhn’s paradigms are also 
accepted based upon serviceability. Kuhn argues that there is no greater metric by which to 
accept paradigms in science than probability because no theory can ever be exposed to all 
possible relevant tests; yet this attitude is still indicative of the same resignation to symbols of 
authority as created by the epic hero (145). Scientists are forced to resign themselves to the faults 
of a paradigm in order to work within the structure created by that paradigm to try and correct 
those faults. If even in the realm of science, the field where everything is meant to be tested and 
proven before acceptance, scientists must resign themselves to the fact that no paradigm will be 
perfect and base further research on these imperfect frameworks, then the same process must 
exist everywhere in society. The epic hero is essential to society because all frames have flaws, 
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and if there is to be any comfort found in society people must have an attitude that resigns them 
to these flaws. 
5.2. – Tragedy 
A tragic attitude, like the epic, is designed to help one resign themselves to their own 
limitations. Under a tragic perspective, one is meant to identify with the narrative and through 
this identification recognize flaws as their own rather than that of the dominant symbols of 
authority. The internalization of fault among people is beneficial to an accepting attitude because 
it takes the burden off society. It is not the system that is broken, rather the people within it 
(Burke 37 ATH). Burke places the epic and the and tragedy within the frame of acceptance 
because they work to draw blame away from the dominant frame and its supporting symbols of 
authority. Where the tragedy differs from the epic comes from, what Burke calls, it's more 
enlightened form (37 ATH). Within tragedy the forensic is often brought to the forefront. The 
forensic genre is an idea originated by Aristotle as one of the three species of rhetoric. Its 
elements consist of accusation and defense, and it deals in the past for the subject of these 
elements are always things of the past (Aristotle in Brummett 150). Burke expands upon 
Aristotle’s idea of the forensic and moves it beyond the judicial realm that Aristotle assigned the 
genre to. Burke sees the forensic as the basis for the verbalization and rationalization of 
community acts, attitudes and policies. The forensic is a reaction to the interaction of individuals 
within a society. Burke specifically looks at the genre as it arises from commerce. As citizens 
interact in the marketplace and as causal relationships form new traditions new values arise. The 
forensic rises as a response to regulate these interactions (254-255 ATH). This response comes in 
the form of the tragedy. Burke finds that the rise of business individualism led to the rise of 
personal ambition as a motive for human acts. The reactionary attitude towards this development 
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of new values was tragic in base. Among reactionaries defending the prior dominant system 
hubris was made into a sin and surrounded by connotations of crime. Burke views tragedy not as 
an attitude meant to make one feel sad, but as a complex trial. Narrative is meant to provide an 
example of the path of sin, as determined by the accepted frame. A tragic attitude serves to 
reinforce the moral codes of the present as it reacts to new societal practices (38 ATH). The 
mirroring of the trial within tragedy for the most part is symbolic. Most narratives will not 
specifically label a crime, judge, and jury, yet this form assists in the empowerment of the 
overall narrative. Burke finds that pure art tends to promote a state of acceptance by placing the 
forensic within the realm of art as it is when shaped into an attitude it becomes more acceptable 
to its reader (201 PLF). The tragic attitude holds power due to the relationship created by the 
reader between reality and the forensic driven by what Dumbrava calls human’s need to 
harmonize with the world by fulfilling their destiny as narrative beings (256). Understanding of 
the world comes through a narratological framework, and by mimicking this process a message 
can become more appealing. The attitude of the tragedy is learned based upon an identification 
with a story and its support of the symbols of authority, rather than a blanket statement on the 
order of things. Dumbrava writes that narrative as a mode of aesthetic knowledge assimilates and 
restores experience in a less obvious and analytical way, but in taking this route becomes more 
compatible with the ambiguity of our destiny as narrative beings (259). Pure art enables 
resignation by resolving in aesthetic fusion trends not resolvable in the practical sphere. A tragic 
attitude provides narratological reasoning for sin and crime in an aesthetic form to maintain the 
acceptance of symbols of authority when challenges to their hierarchy and definitions arise.  
An example of how a tragic attitude plays out in society can be seen in the way legal 
codes are created and interpreted. In the United States laws are curated based upon legal 
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precedent, which can be viewed as the narratological retelling of the law. Legal precedent 
determines how laws should be carried out in the future, if at all, based upon instances where the 
law was unclear and the ruling of the court in those situations. Cases are decided, society is 
directly shaped, by how justices interpret the forensic narratives presented to them. The legal 
system attempts to define events through a code; yet the legal code itself is formed through the 
moral lessons learned from dominant narratives. Laws can be shaped to fit these narratives 
because of the forensic nature intrinsic in societal narrative found in its call for adjudication on 
good reasons. This, to an extent, is the outlined purpose of the forensic genre. Burke finds the 
forensic in the tragic attitude because the tragedy is reflective of the stories presented to society 
every day that lead to the determination of criminality. People do not come to accept laws from 
their codified version rather from the forensic genre implicit to all societal narratives that lead to 
the formation of laws in the first place. This is because it is from the aesthetic representation of 
the law that they become moralized. Foucault writes that a true politician will bind his or her 
people “by the chain of their own ideas,” and that this chain is made even stronger when the 
people believe these ideas to have been of their own formation. A leader or institution in order to 
master society and gain their position will sow a chain of ideas in their citizens' minds as this 
allows for them to guide society in the direction they wish (102-103). Citizens will support the 
laws of their nation, follow their leaders, because the ideas implicit in these laws have already 
been accepted through the narratives that come to control idea formation all the way from birth.  
5.3. – Comedy 
Burke’s final attitude within the frame of acceptance is the comedy. Like tragedy being a 
more enlightened form than the epic, Burke finds comedy to be a more civilized form of the 
tragedy. He backs this claim by pointing out that only the happiest of classes can produce good 
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comedy (39 ATH). For a comedic attitude to arise in the accepted frame those within it must be 
truly content with their place. They must have already been brought to resign themselves to what 
they have been told are their own limitations via the epic and tragedy. For all this advancement 
though, Burke also compares the comedic category to a content village that has evolved its 
culture at the edge of a sleeping volcano preparing to break forth and scatter destruction (39 
ATH). The destructive forbearing of the comedic frame is based upon the fact that for one class 
to rise to peak happiness requires the oppression of the other classes. For the class that has risen 
above the others, Burke writes that their interests provide cues that distort the interpretive frame, 
leading them to see an apparent totality of the dominant frame over the world when in reality it is 
a mere partiality (40 ATH). Those within the dominant class will see their frame as that of all of 
society ignoring its failures due to the material gain that comes with adequate representation. 
Burke names this phenomenon class morality, and it goes hand in hand with another of his 
concepts, cultural lag.  
As opposed to class morality, cultural lag is related to the rise of the other classes of 
people who are not accurately portrayed by a frame (40 ATH). These groups are culturally 
dispossessed and often accused of attitudinizing as a means of discreditation. Their new ideas, 
that go against the dominant frame, according to Burke, are often thought of as opinions rather 
than facts and thus can be ignored by the beneficiaries of a frame (41 ATH). A Comedic attitude 
like a tragic one warns against new attitudes but shifts from pointing out the criminal to the 
stupid. People are not vicious rule breakers, but just mistaken in their perspective. Where tragedy 
warns against the dangers of hubris by labeling it criminal, comedy labels it as mere stupidity. A 
comic attitude delegitimizes new values in an attempt to make subscribers of the new idea appear 
as ridiculous and ignorable. Comedy attempts to point out the errors in the attitudes of the 
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oppressed classes through dramatic irony (41 ATH). In order to do this, comedy, like tragedy, 
must develop a logical forensic causality, as this allows for syllogistic deduction on the part of 
the reader. The comedic attitude differs from the tragic in that the logical forensic causality built 
up deals with the question of what is humane rather than a tragic attitude which looks at what is 
in-humane. This presents a “dramatization of quirks and foibles” that guides one holding a 
comedic attitude in support of the symbols of authority on the proper ways to live within the 
dominant frame (42 ATH). The attitudinizing nature of the comedic attitude forms many of the 
fictitious relationships between classes that helps maintain hegemony.  
The comedic attitude allows for the passing over of other opinions due to their presumed 
ridiculous nature. One example of Kuhn’s in his description of paradigm shift had to do with the 
transition from the belief in the geocentric universe to the heliocentric universe. Kuhn explains 
how the shift to the Copernican view of the universe did not happen immediately; instead, it 
needed further evidence and proof that it was a more serviceable model then that of the 
geocentric universe (150). The burden of proof was so large for the shift to the heliocentric 
universe because of how it was framed in society. Interpreters of the bible believed that it clearly 
stated that the earth was unmoving, and in multiple sections of the King James Bible passages 
can be found that discuss the earth's immobility (First Chronicles 16:30, Psalm 104:5 and 
Ecclesiastes 1:5). Many in the religious world responded to Copernicus not by disproving his 
findings but by making them out to be ridiculous and calling into question Copernicus’s 
character. Martin Luther wrote: 
There is talk of a new astrologer who wants to prove that the earth moves and goes 
around instead of the sky, the sun, the moon, just as if somebody were moving in a 
carriage or ship might hold that he was sitting still and at rest while the earth and the trees 
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walked and moved. But that is how things are nowadays: when a man wishes to be clever 
he must . . . invent something special, and the way he does it needs to be the best! The 
fool wants to turn the whole art of astronomy upside-down. However, as Holy Scripture 
tells us, so did Joshua bid the sun to stand still and not the earth (Pogge quoting Luther).  
Luther does not discuss the scientific principles at work in Copernichus’s theory, instead just 
passes him off as a fool. The devices noted by Burke in the comedic category hold great power 
in the societal realm. The ability to reject sound reason on the basis that it does not match current 
conceptions allows institutions to maintain power. As Burke notes though, this is a dangerous 
path to walk. If sound reason can come to control the narrative surrounding a topic and 
overpower the attitudinizing of the opposing institution that institution's position will be severely 
weakened. The Volcano will erupt, and the village will be destroyed.  
 What does this destruction really entail though? Are symbols of authority rejected and 
replaced by new ones or are they just extended in a way that opens them up to the left behind 
groups by cultural lag? The narratological control granted to institutions by the formation of 
community makes it difficult to believe that symbols of authority can ever truly be rejected. 
Attitudes of acceptance are extremely powerful and gripping because of all the support networks 
in place that maintain them. Forming new ideas is difficult when identity formation is tied to 
public memory, which will align with the dominant ideological beliefs of a time. Foucault writes 
that people are kept in line not by a central power or a network of forces, but by a network of 
diverse elements. These mechanisms might be intended to comfort, but they also all exercise a 
power of normalization for dominant ideological beliefs (307-308). The mechanisms discussed 
by Foucault are that of the prison system, but he also notes the power of discursive control for 
normalization. By the nature of their hegemony dominant groups have gained control over 
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societal narratives. The rise of other classes endangers this control, but dominant groups have the 
ability and incentive to respond to this danger. These groups will respond in a way that benefits 
them the most because of class morality and the pleasure principle. They will attempt to subvert 
rejection and extend frames in a way that maintains their dominance and lessens the threat of 
rising secondary groups. Burke discusses this practice when he talks about the attitudes that rise 
during times of transition. 
 
6. - Transitional Attitudes  
Burke studies times of transition to see how frames or paradigms interact and how 
attitudes are formed from that interaction. Transitionary periods occur due to pressures placed on 
attitudes of acceptance by attitudes of rejection. As pressure is placed on the dominant symbols 
of authority, they begin to lose their authoritative value and the frame they exist within loses its 
control. When Burke discusses attitudes as existing during times of transition, he is talking about 
the attitudes that arise as a frame reaches its breaking point. These attitudes attempt to subvert 
the rejection of symbols of authority by extending them to appease the groups holding an attitude 
of rejection pushing the frame to its breaking point. Burke calls this breaking point a frame’s 
Malthusian Limit. Burke derives his idea of the Malthusian limit from the ideas of Thomas 
Malthus on population growth and the world’s limited supply of resources. Burke conceptualizes 
that much like Malthus’s belief in the earth’s limited population capacity, and the breaking point 
that would come if such capacity was surpassed, frames can face their own breaking points (298 
ATH). Unlike Malthus though, the thing that pushes the breaking point of a frame is not 
population, but by the products of the bureaucratization of the imagination. Burke describes the 
bureaucratization of the imagination as the phenomenon by which imaginative possibilities are 
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shaped when they are embodied in the realities of social texture (Burke 225 ATH). As ideas are 
integrated into society aspects of those ideas must be compromised for the idea to gain traction 
within the existing societal framework. For new frames to be accepted by others requires them to 
be structured in a way that trades imaginative possibility for acceptability by other’s terministic 
screens. The existence of the bureaucratization of the imagination is evidence of the institutional 
control over narrative and thought. For people to come together they must work within the 
discursive restraints of the dominant narratological system. Completely new values can arise, but 
in order to challenge pre-existing value systems, they must be morphed to fit within others moral 
reading of narrative. Fisher says for a narrative to be considered rational it must fulfill the 
demands of narrative probability and fidelity (2). A narrative that presents an entirely new moral 
argument will not be viewed as coherent or feasible to individuals who have been pressured their 
entire existence to think within the dominant frame. To gain support, to gain narrative rationality, 
new ideas must be bureaucratized. This bureaucratization is seen through the shaping of ideas to 
incorporate the spiritual factors already in place in the objective and material order of society 
determined by symbols of authority (Burke 112 ATH). Burke sees this as taking place when an 
imaginative possibility is made to embody “all the complexity of language and habits, in the 
property of relationships, the methods of the government, production and distribution, and in the 
development of rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis” (225 ATH). Eventually though, this 
same process that helped create the support for a frame will lead it to its breaking point due to 
the byproducts it creates.  
The potential Malthusian limit of a frame is due to the imperfections of the 
bureaucratization of the imagination. Burke claims that human beings are not a perfect fit for any 
historic texture. This creates a need for compromise to enable group formation. Certain 
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emphases will need to be stressed leading to the neglect of others. The unintended byproducts of 
the bureaucratic order arise from the neglect of factors made necessary by compromise (225-226 
ATH). They exist as the factors neglected by the compromise that allowed certain values to be 
engrained in the symbols of authority. New ideas will be forced to shape around old ones and as 
a result will eventually face the same problems as the old frame. When these byproducts become 
stronger than the original purpose of a frame, a frame will be brought to its breaking point (226 
ATH). Burke finds that three key symptoms exist that show a frame is reaching its breaking 
point during transitionary periods. As a frame reaches its Malthusian limit, it becomes 
endangered of losing its serviceability, the thing that draws support to a frame. To survive a 
frame or its supporters will attempt to portray the frame as still serviceable through the 
maintenance of the pleasure principle (9, 21 PC).  Burke first states that for a time a frame will 
be extended to meet the new necessities of what is serviceable by “casuistic stretching” (133 
ATH). Casuistic stretching is the introduction of new principles into a frame while remaining 
faithful to the old principles of that frame. Any metaphorical expansion is an aspect of casuistic 
stretching (230 ATH). Burke finds however that an over subtle or deceptive form of reasoning 
for protection, as in casuistic stretching, cannot last and eventually will lead to demoralization 
rather than reclamation. People will become disturbed as a frame is stretched too far in order to 
answer questions previously problematic to the frame and push away from it. Tied to casuistry, 
Burke also discusses how force can be used to maintain a frame once it has reached its breaking 
point (134 ATH). Systems of discipline and punishment mentioned by Foucault will be used to 
make opposing a frame unpleasant, but even Burke says this is limited, as after a certain point 
living within a frame will be even more unpleasant than any punishment involved in rejecting it 
(Foucault 158). Finally, Burke notes that as a frame truly reaches its breaking point there will be 
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an increased reliance upon whatever resource for prayer a frame can provide. For instance, in the 
medieval frame prayer as a tool to subdue rejection came in the form of a threat to force a 
recalcitrant beyond the possibility of the salvation promised by the frame (134 ATH).   This will 
again stall a frame from reaching its breaking point, but in the end the dominant frame will force 
its opposers to accept a symbolic atheism. This is the same position that the satiric proposes 
those in a frame of rejection must take and will be discussed later. Burke finds that it is once 
people are willing to give away the symbolic salvation offered by a frame that it can be 
replaced. Burke sees these three practices as evidence that transition is taking place. Kuhn also 
investigates characteristics of transition but focuses more on the qualities of new ideas that 
support transition rather then symptoms that arise in an attempt to subvert it.   
Kuhn studies the history of science in order to provide specific examples of what causes 
paradigm shifts. He states that the transfer of allegiances from one paradigm to another cannot be 
forced but rather must be a conversion experience (151). Calls for conversion will arise from 
investigations that lead the scientific profession to a new set of commitments that will begin 
when the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of 
scientific practice (Kuhn 6). What ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in science is when one 
paradigm provides answers for specific questions that were impossible to answer within the old 
frame. Necessary to build this metric of correctness is the act of falsification (146). Kuhn 
describes falsification as the creation of a criterion of improbability, which states the number of 
problems solved by each paradigm (147-148). Falsification is a test where a negative outcome 
calls for the rejection of an established theory (Kuhn on Popper 146). Falsification converts 
because it is directly attempting to prove a frame is inaccurate, yet the process is not always 
straightforward. Kuhn warns that if any failure is grounds for rejection, then all theories would 
33 
 
be rejected (146). Building a hard criterion for the acceptance of something helps to assuage this 
problem, yet the grey area still exists. The metric by which new frames are measured is 
problematic because it is extremely hard to justify proof when individuals see the world in very 
different ways (150). There is no way to overcome this struggle, but Kuhn does point to certain 
actions that make falsification more effective. He claims that when a new paradigm can be 
legitimately shown to solve a problem that led another into crises it leads more people to shift 
allegiance (153).  
Kuhn also discusses the idea of simplicity as another method for paradigm shift. Kuhn 
argues that new paradigms are not formed already answering the questions that have led the 
previous frames to crises. Frames require people to flesh them out to accept the byproducts 
unacceptable within the old frame. If new paradigms were solely judged upon problem solving, 
then there would never be anyone to actually discover a frame's problem-solving capabilities. 
Kuhn finds that it is a frame’s appeal to people's aesthetic motives by appearing to provide a 
simpler or neater picture of the world that initially attracts original converts to a frame (Kuhn 
157). Why the aesthetic holds this power over us is most likely due to what Burke sees as the 
intermingling of our aesthetic values with our ethical values. He finds that the most practical of 
revolutions are generally found to have first manifested in an aesthetic sphere mirroring what 
Kuhn sees in the scientific realm (201 PLF).  Burke concludes that things seen as ethical are 
often connected to what is viewed as aesthetic. An appeal to aesthetics then can be understood as 
an appeal to morals, and as the ethical value of a frame begins to fracture around its breaking 
point, one can begin to see why a new frame might seem more aesthetic to some and allow for 
initial conversion.  
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6.1. – Grotesque 
Burke’s attitudes that relate to times of transition stem from the characteristics laid out by 
he and Kuhn regarding the switching over from one frame to the next. The first transitionary 
attitude identified by Burke is the grotesque (Burke 57 ATH). A grotesque attitude focuses on 
mysticism, which in this use refers to a submission to a higher power as the provider of ideology 
(Burke 58 ATH).  Burke attaches mysticism to transitionary periods because he finds that 
throughout history mysticism as a collective movement has come about mainly in times of severe 
confusion of the cultural frame. To become popular mysticism requires a mass shift in people’s 
allegiance to symbols of authority, which occurs as a dominant frame reaches its breaking point 
(Burke 58 ATH). A mystic attitude seeks to propel the subjective elements of imagery within the 
forensic pattern meant to support a frame above the objective or public elements. One example 
of this process at work can be seen in the reaction of devout American Christians to climate 
change. The climate change narrative is one supported by the scientific world. Scientists claim 
that their models prove global warming's presence to the greatest of their ability, and effects of 
climate change can already be seen today. Even with all the scientific support though, a large 
group of people still doubt that climate change exists and is a man-made phenomenon. A 2014 
study by the Public Religion Research Institute revealed that almost half of all Americans 
attributed the severity of recent natural disasters to Biblical end times, and among white 
evangelicals, that number jumped to 77 percent (Jones et al). This response to climate change 
does not seek to disprove its existence, rather it looks to take agency away from people. Climate 
change is part of God's plan and therefore should be accepted as natural. God gifted the earth and 
its resources to man, and it is man's birthright to use these resources. The grotesque attitude 
taken up by climate change deniers propels the subjective imagery of a frame over threatening 
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objective material. It allows for the acceptance of climate change, while at the same time calling 
for no change of behavior or lifestyle for people. Mysticism as a practice stretches a frame to 
cover barriers once faced by it. It opens the possibility of acceptance of the symbols of authority 
by removing agency from a situation. In placing the subjective above the objective, a grotesque 
attitude allows for a world to be built that favors belief rather than fact.  
The grotesque manages to portray the relative nature of systems through its presentation 
of incongruity. Burke names the grotesque as the cult of incongruity minus the laughter. He 
emphasizes the lack of laughter to show how the grotesque diverges in its use of incongruity 
from humor. Humor, like the grotesque, is rife with incongruities, but unlike the grotesque, it 
attempts to reassure by minimizing the magnitude of obstacles. The scaling down of threats in 
this manner provides relief through laughter. (Burke 58-59 ATH). By losing this laughter, 
grotesque leads one to approach incongruity in a serious manner. This guides one to see past 
forensic structures that creates the sense of incongruity to its symbolic interpretive basis (Burke 
60 ATH).  The grotesque depending upon the situation can have varying effects regarding 
acceptance and rejection yet will ultimately lead one to a certain passivity towards symbols of 
authority. Burke studies these effects by looking at mysticism’s relationship with monasticism 
and gang morality.  
Burke believes that the monastic lifestyle exists solely in the transitional, and as such is an 
excellent case study to look at how these transitional times affect communal organization. He 
finds that monastic orders, assuming they have not been corrupted by business interests, recruit 
their initiates at a point of crises, and then work to institutionalize the mentality prevailing at that 
point (69-70 ATH). Monasteries exist in such a form as to promote a sense of mysticism or 
spirituality amongst their members. This maintains the frame of acceptance even at this point of 
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crises. Existing in a permanent state of transition suspends the monastery and its members 
between heaven and earth, remaining in the subjective state that exists in transition (70 ATH). 
From monastic tradition the power of a grotesque attitude to organize and maintain a public 
order is seen. Those within the monastic life, by being recruited at a point of transition, open 
themselves to the symbolic redefinition perpetuated by a grotesque attitude. This works 
maintains the strict order of monastic life without the fear that its members might question it. 
The grotesque in this form then becomes what Burke calls a “passive frame of acceptance” 
useful for maintaining order. Burke also finds that this passive frame of acceptance can grow 
from the concept of gang morality, just in a very different way.  
 Burke believes there is a sense of guilt associated with existing between two worlds. 
People are driven to exist in a certain frame because doing otherwise would make them feel 
uncomfortable in society or left out of it. The monastic seeks to assuage the sense of guilt felt by 
a ritual of contrition; yet, that guilt can also be approached by the explicit rejection of contrition. 
Burke notes this explicit rejection as it exists within “gang morality” (72 ATH). He states that a 
gang morality arises when the orthodox values are no longer enough to handle a situation leading 
to the dispossession of individuals. The dispossession portrays itself within an individual as 
negativism, which will lead the individual to reject everything in rejecting a little. Essentially the 
rejection of anything will become the rejection of everything. Individuals existing in a state of 
rejection like this will overcome their guilt by forming bands of their own ideas, or a new frame 
of rejection (73 ATH). Like the monastic then, gang morality ends with some organization, but 
where the monastic creates a material organization starting at a point of spirituality, gang 
morality leads to a spiritual one starting at a point of materiality. It is spiritual in that the ideas of 
the organization confront an imperfect world with the ideas of a better one, ideas that are 
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idealistic rather than realistic. 74 ATH). The idea of class morality, discussed earlier, shares this 
approach, which is why Burke thinks of gang morality as a “dignified variant of the same 
process” (73 ATH). Gang Morality allows for the confrontation of the imperfect world with the 
idea of a future better one, yet this still creates an attitude of passivity to the frame of acceptance. 
Confronting today’s problems with the idea that a new brighter future is imminent leads one to 
remain within a frame of acceptance. One will choose to remain because the maintenance of 
existence within the problemed frame is what will lead to a brighter future. In creating the belief 
that a frame brings about its own destruction one is incentivized to remain in the frame they 
might vehemently reject. Marxist thought is an example of this. Marx preaches that the 
capitalistic system will create its own downfall through its oppression and concurrent expansion 
of the proletariat class (19-21). Even though Marx is ultimately calling for the rejection of 
capitalism he is maintaining that capitalism must run its course for it to fall. Although it might 
seem counterintuitive what Marx is actually calling for is a passivity to the dominant symbols of 
authority. By believing that symbols of authority will bring about their own destruction one will 
come to maintain their existence within the system. They will not necessarily adopt an attitude of 
acceptance towards the symbols of authority but neither will they adopt and attitude of rejection.  
6.2. – Didactic 
Burke’s second transitional attitude is related to the didactic, or what might commonly be 
referred to as propaganda. The didactic differs from the grotesque because where the grotesque 
makes for passivity in the frame of acceptance, the didactic makes for activity (75 ATH). Burke 
finds that in the unfolding of history the imaginative expression of a trend precedes its 
conceptual critical counterpart, i.e. art will be the first representation of new ideas (201 PLF). 
The didactic seeks to reverse this process though in forming the imaginative in obedience to 
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critical postulates (75 ATH). Burke notes this motive as it plays out in democratic versus 
totalitarian regimes. He finds that democracies leadership by impermanent delegates and party 
systems leads to the use of debunking devices such as propaganda to slander dominant symbolic 
definition. This practice takes away the possibility for integrative impulses in people to assign a 
hero. The inability to produce a central figure of power protects democratic regimes from a threat 
of totalitarianism. Parliamentary or democratic systems release modes of thought, via the 
didactic, that seeks to protect its citizens by cutting off their possibility of creating a “heroic 
fountain-head” (77-78 ATH).  Totalitarian regimes on the other hand do the exact opposite. Their 
use of propaganda provides their populations with opportunities for the mythification of their 
leaders, but in doing so prevents criticism and the possibility of rejection (78 ATH). This regime 
instead of being based upon and morphed by the imagination of the populous uses their systems 
to produce art in order to sway the populous to their side. Burke writes that a didactic attitude 
seeks to avoid the confusions of synthesis, or the bureaucratization of the imagination, by 
labeling people within the binary of friend or foe. This system as with most systems based upon 
binaries leads to oversimplification and can be looked at by its opposition as a sentimentality 
over anything else (79 ATH). Burke labels sentimentality as the weak side of didacticism and 
that in such a light it becomes an “act of will” (79 ATH). When one looks into societal trends, 
they will come across good trends and bad ones, where all the good are balanced by the bad and 
vice versa. A sentimental attitude serves as an act of will in that it leads people to label the good 
as what is true. Such acts lead to a transcendence of the original classification of a frame as good 
and bad by keeping only what is true, the good. The didactic internalizes this approach in order 
to maintain traditional symbols of authority within transitional periods when they are reaching 
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their Malthusian limit. An attitude of the didactic develops a trust within an institution even 
when objective surface level facts might make their actions out to be negative.  
The development of a didactic attitude within its members is an active way institutions 
can maintain a hold over symbolic definition. Research on public memory shows how this 
process is internalized in the behavior of institutions. Identities exist by virtue of memories and 
memories by virtue of society (Reyes 226). Symbols are mobilized to shape the past into an 
authoritative narrative that renders public memory as something explicitly persuasive (227). 
Institutions define symbols of authority by crafting public memory. Retelling history in their own 
words allows dominant groups to control identity formation and the moral lessons from these 
events. Take for instance the way in which the United States has decided to educate students on 
the Vietnam War. William Griffen and John Marciano study the Vietnam war and the current 
constructed narrative around the conflict. They relate the Pentagon Papers, a set of government 
documents that gave insight into the decision making during the war, to the narrative of the war 
crafted in secondary education history textbooks. They argue that textbooks offer an obvious 
means of realizing hegemony in education and that they establish parameters for students that 
define what is legitimate, reasonable, practical, true and beautiful (163). This means that the 
omission of crucial facts or views greatly limits the ways in which students come to view 
historical events (163). Griffen and Marciano find that the wide ideological range of textbooks 
they studied “rationalized and affirmed the official US view, rarely placing the assembled facts 
in the context of a reasoned and rigorous examination” (167). They argue that these texts have 
failed to examine the fundamental nature of the war and the social, economic and political 
contradictions that brought it about (165). Griffen and Marciano conclude by saying that the 
government presents a singular narrative about the Vietnam war because they are aware that a 
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critically informed understanding of the Vietnam war will undermine their hegemonic 
domination (169). The crafting of the Vietnam war by the US shows how public memory can be 
shaped to affect value systems and by an extension identity. Narratives are selected based upon 
their good reasons (Fisher 2). The US shapes the memory of Vietnam in order to dictate the 
moral lessons gained from the war. At least in schoolbooks, Vietnam is remembered as a battle 
between democracy and communism. In its retelling the US government incorporates symbols of 
authority, specifically the good versus evil nature in the battle over communism, to cement their 
power. Altering history to support messaging allows institutions to maintain the moral 
positioning posited by their connected symbols of authority as well as strengthen their definition 
of those symbols as it attempts to wipe out counter narratives that argue for other good morals.  
Griffen and Marciano end their discussion of textbooks' role in swaying education by 
describing how these textbooks help schools perform one of their largest social functions. They 
believe that the most basic function of schools is to obtain an uncritical acceptance of present 
society (164). This perspective stands contrary to what might be the popular belief of the public 
in regard to school’s purpose, yet Griffen and Marciano believe that the influence granted to the 
dominant class over learning is intrinsic to the idea of hegemony, the “influence that dominant 
classes or groups exercise by virtue of their control of ideological institutions’” (163). Burke 
recognizes the power institutions exert over the populace and its role in stretching a frame, but 
still believes at some point a frame can reach its breaking point and a frame of rejection can take 
over. That being said it becomes difficult to believe that the rejection of a frame can ever come 
about and not just a casuistic stretching due the control granted to the dominant class by the 
nature of their hegemony. 
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Schools are not the only place the acceptance of an ideology is taught; dominant 
ideologies are reinforced in the everyday practices of life. In the current capitalistic system one 
method of control has come to dominate society. Monetary symbolism touches every aspect of 
daily routines in today’s society and has made a true rejection of the current frame very difficult. 
Burke describes that under the neo-Malthusian principle one could assume that the enactment of 
financial policy as called for by a casuistic stretching of the current frame would eventually lead 
to inflation rates that would destroy the basis of money (162 ATH). Burke backs this claim with 
traditional economic theory but notes that the true nature of monetary symbolism will alter this 
effect. He finds that the huge network of debt that has been created from the global economy has 
led money to not be backed by a material but by a social function. Money has come to be a 
“symbolic superstructure” that defines societal interactions from the individual to global level. 
Economists who study the symbolic nature of monetary systems do not clarify these processes 
but serve to mystify them (162-163 ATH). Economic processes are presented as natural effects 
rising from simple supply and demand principles. In reality though these effects are the result of 
the system they were bred from not part of the natural order. Monetary symbolism has been 
manipulated to form the idea that an invisible hand controls market forces. Society has been 
shaped around the flow of supply and demand making the process appear natural within the 
current system when its placement is really the result of ideological leanings. Capitalistic ideas, 
the influence of money has not remained purely in the economic realm but has spread into the 
grammar of thought that influences how everything is understood. The grammar of thought is 
how symbols are used and understood in line with the ideological leanings of a time. Today 
discourse is shaped around the influence of monetary symbolism. Even ideas that reject the idea 
of private property still are based in a grammar of thought centered around monetary symbolism. 
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Lakoff and Johnson talk about conceptual metaphors as symbols that assist in the understanding 
of other concepts or ideas in terms of that symbol. They write that “the most fundamental values 
in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in 
culture” (22). Ideas of money have changed dramatically during the curvature of history, but as 
long as there has been civilization there has been some metric of value associated with goods. 
These value metrics from their origin have stood as conceptual metaphors that have shaped 
culture and the understanding of the world. Their position has shaped dialogue and restricted 
new ideas to fit within the realm of monetary symbolism. One example of this can be seen in the 
study of environmentalism. In order to translate to the community at large the implication of 
environmental issues such as climate change, the damage caused by them oftentimes must be put 
in terms of a dollar value. It is difficult for many who are not well versed in the subject to 
understand the implications of these events without the assignment of a monetary marker.  An 
entire field of study, environmental economics, works to assign value to the environment to help 
promote sustainable practices. Ideas of money are so concrete in society that to understand the 
consequences of things such as environmental issues they must be put in terms of dollars. Reyes 
writes that when discursive subjugation is taken up and enacted it ceases to be seen as socially 
constructed (228). Money has become a simple fact of society. Although a creation of social 
construction monetary symbolism is now an innate part of the social system. The concept of 
money cannot be rejected in a frame if that frame seeks to become dominant. A casuistic 
stretching might take place to limit the influence of money to the extent that it is not 
recognizable as it is today, but the concept of money is so ingrained in peoples way of life that a 
new frame cannot arise that will outright reject it.  Monetary symbolism is just one instance of 
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this control, symbol systems are rife with conceptual metaphors that support a frame of 
acceptance and make it extremely difficult to truly think outside the dominant frame. 
  
7. - Attitudes of Rejection 
One of the major points made by Burke in his discussion of the transitional is that there is 
a limit to how much casuistic stretching a frame can take before it breaks. Burke supports this 
claim by looking at the large-scale shifts that have taken place in society. These shifts did not 
just happen instantaneously though, and even Burke recognizes how the casuistic stretching of a 
previous frame made room for the appearance of the new one (229 ATH). What is the breaking 
point though? When do altered value systems go from being the result of the casuistic stretching 
of a frame to that of a new frame? Burke looks at the monastic order as constantly existing in a 
state of transition (70 ATH). Society also exists in a constant state of transition. New ideas are 
constantly being created, and their interaction with different attitudes constantly shifts how one 
feels about symbols of authority. This constant stream of new ideas though, does not lead to a 
continuous stream of new frames and symbols of authority. Instead they extend symbols of 
authority to cover those new ideas once they gain enough popularity. For those new ideas to gain 
support they must first traverse the narratological landscape controlled by the dominant class. 
Ideas must be bureaucratized and lose their imaginative possibilities or their true state of 
rejection if they are to gain support. They must be placed in the language of the dominant class 
for others to see their narrative rationality and accept their moral arguments and attitude towards 
the symbols of authority. Ideas must also be made identifiable by relating to concepts already 
attached to public memory (Reyes 226). These restrictions placed on new ideas due to the 
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hegemonic control of narrative makes the rejection of a frame impossible under normal 
circumstances. Burke outlines different frames in history because he takes a wide-lens view 
when looking at frames. If that lens is brought down though to look at the daily interaction of 
attitudes within frames, it becomes much harder to separate frames. It is hard to separate frames 
because these frames are not ever actually rejected. The attitudes of the grotesque and didactic 
constantly reshape how symbols of authority are perceived in order to perpetually stretch them 
and maintain a frame. There is no limit to casuistic stretching. What Burke notes as the limit is 
just the point where the stretching of a frame has made it unrecognizable. Burke sees this as a 
shift because of the macro approach he takes to the study, but in actuality it is a long fluid 
process that brings about this change. The change is based upon the old frame and as such it 
should not be viewed as a rejection but a continuation. Burke’s limit on the power of force to 
maintain a frame also comes across as shortsighted and unaligned with the ideas of Foucault. 
Foucault outlines the role played by disciplinary practices in forming and maintaining ideology. 
He underlines how deeply engrained and necessary these practices are for society to exist as it 
does (158). Following Foucault, it can be reasoned that like casuistic stretching there is no limit 
to the influence of force. Although at a point living within the restrictions of certain symbols of 
authority will become more unpleasant than the discipline faced by its rejection a hierarchy 
formed around practices of discipline and punishment will remain. The ideas that bring about 
rejection will be born out of a disciplinary system and will be implemented through one. Ideas 
will be bureaucratized to fit within disciplinary systems, so they to can be engrained in society. 
These disciplinary systems exist as one of the spiritual factors new ideas must be founded upon 
to spread. Practices of force are not limited because they are necessary for new ideas to become 
an ideology. Disciplinary systems support the casuistic stretching of symbols of authority by 
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incorporating the altered values of these symbols into the everyday practices of individuals. They 
deny the possibility of rejection because new ideas must still fit within the system to become a 
part of society, and true rejection would just destroy the system. In the world of science, it makes 
sense to label a new paradigm as the rejection of the old. When new scientific discoveries come 
about it can reshape how everything is thought about as Kuhn shares. In the real world though, it 
is impossible, due to all the many reasons discussed, for a new idea to completely reshape how 
society is processed. New ideas are limited and must be based upon what came before. Unlike in 
the world of science, there is not going to be some huge discovery backed by an established 
method that is going to come about and change everything unless aliens invade, or the 
coronavirus wipes out civilization. There are too many structures in place for a rejection to 
happen in society as it might in the world of science. What Burke notes as attitudes of rejection 
are not actually forces of rejection, rather they are the attitudes of secondary classes that seek to 
expand a frame and symbols of authority to cover their needs. Attitudes of rejection actually seek 
to bring about transitional attitudes in order caustically stretch a frame because the hegemonic 
domination of narrative makes true rejection impossible.  
7.1. – Elegy 
The first attitude Burke discusses as one of rejection is the attitude shown within the 
elegy or plaint, which can be understood as literature rhetorically related to complaint. On the 
individual level, the attitude of the elegiac is of a paradoxical nature. Burke finds that once a man 
has perfected a technique of complaint, he can be more at home with sorrow than possible 
without it. Complaint to the individual is a tool used like the epic or tragedy to come to terms 
with the world’s faults. Burke explains that people beholden to an attitude of complaint will find 
that the integrity of their character is best upheld by situations from which they can complain. On 
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the individual level, complaining is a therapeutic practice. In a restaurant people complain to 
waiters when there is a problem with the service or food. In their complaint the patrons are not 
expecting change to arise from their words. Complaint just makes those individuals feel better 
about the supposed atrocity committed because they at least said something about it. The attitude 
of complaint on a per person basis maintains symbols of authority. The therapeutic nature of 
complaint leads individuals to want to maintain what brought up the complaint and as such 
presents itself more as an attitude of acceptance (44 ATH). Where the elegiac attitude transcends 
the realm of acceptance into what Burke calls a frame of rejection comes with the organization of 
the attitude.  
Burke finds that if organized as a collective movement, a class will arise to “move in on” 
the complaint. This complaint will be expounded upon providing more and more points for 
complaint until the physical limits of the previous attitude are reached and it is replaced (44 
ATH). Burke relates the elegy to humor because they both cause the improper estimation of a 
situation. Like humor, an organized attitude of complaint causes one to inaccurately size up their 
own resources. The elegy separates itself from humor in that the real disproportion of the 
situation is spread between the weakness of the self and the magnitude of the situation (44 ATH). 
The apparent inaccuracy of the plaint leads Burke to describe it as homeopathic, and through this 
connection it becomes clear as to how complaint serves the frame of rejection. An attitude of 
complaint is homeopathic as it seeks to develop a tolerance to possibilities of misfortune by 
accustoming one to misfortune in small doses. On an individual scale this represents itself in a 
therapeutic way. Brought up to a larger scale though a call to action will arise out of the 
confidence built up around the normalization of an enemy. A homoeopathic style is based upon 
the idea that danger cannot be handled head on but must be accommodated. The elegy serves to 
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prepare one for dangerous times by accepting the existence of these times prior to their arrival 
(44-47 footnote ATH). To see the power of organized complaint in sparking an attitude of 
rejection one needs look no further than the current president of the US, Donald Trump. Trump 
has grown infamous for his attacks on the “liberal media” as a source of “Fake News”. Trump 
attacks the media in this form to prepare his audience to face the anti-Trump rhetoric perpetuated 
by the liberal media. Brett Stephens argues that the president is trying to depose so-called 
mainstream media in favor of the media he likes (108). In order to do this though he must instill 
in his audience a fear of the factual reporting done by mainstream news agencies. Trump's 
homeopathic form of organized complaint prepares his audience to face down the media by 
bringing into question what a fact is. Stephens claims that Trump's objection to the liberal media 
is not that there’s a liberal bias that gets in the way of its objectivity, but to objectivity itself 
(108). Trump prepares his audience to question the nature of factuality. He does this so he can 
make claims that are not factually supported but still accepted. The attitude of complaint among 
Trump and his audience has allowed them to overcome a great danger to his presidency, facts. 
This is something that could not be faced head on, but by preparing his audience, by 
accommodating them to the idea of fake news, Trump's word has become all that matters to his 
followers. Trump has been able to convince people that he has won the popular vote, that he has 
had the largest inauguration ever, and many other things that can be factually disproven because 
he homeopathically prepared his audience to question the media (Stephens 108). He has been 
able to instill an attitude of rejection in his audience that calls into question the traditional 
symbols of authority associated with the media and stabilize his in-group. Although this attitude 
rejects the liberal media it does not actually bring about framal rejection of the symbols of 
authority as Burke might argue. Trump in his actions is rejecting the liberal media, but not the 
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role they play. What Trump is doing is attempting to capture the symbols of authority held by the 
media for his own benefit. As stated by Stephens he is attempting to depose the mainstream 
media for sources that support him. This is not a rejection, rather an evolution for his and his 
base’s benefit. Trump is repurposing symbols of authority to support his ideology, not rejecting 
them. Through an elegiac attitude he is attempting to alter public memory to gain control over 
identity formation. Reyes discusses this process as a form of control, and that is how Trump is 
using it (227). Instead of leading to organized rejection, Trump’s dissemination of an attitude of 
complaint is seeking to strengthen symbols of authority and their control over society, just in a 
way that benefits him the most. The plaint as seen through this example is not an attitude that 
brings about rejection, just a forced change in who controls symbols of authority. The symbols 
are maintained, just shifted to support an altered value system.  
Within the plaint Burke also points out a pastoral element, as might have come across in 
the figure of Trump and his interactions with his base seen in the previous example. The heroic 
device of the elegy operates in the sympathetic treatment of humble people, as it often places the 
lowly as the bearers of true nobility (48 ATH). The elegy looks to serve those most abandoned 
by the frame of acceptance by placing them within this heroic lens. An attitude of complaint 
searches to disrupt the order of the dominant frame by empowering the oppressed and organizing 
them in a way to be prepared for the dangers, such as punishment, that come from questioning 
those in power. The pastoral aspect present within an elegiac attitude assists in the redefinition of 
piety, further empowering a state of rejection. For Burke piety is related to ones yearning to 
conform with the sources of their being (69 PC). By this definition piety is not confined to 
religion; it is instead connected to patterns of judgement developed in childhood, which might 
include but is not limited to religion. As one matures, they will revise and amplify these 
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childhood patterns, so they can be conformed to new experiences. Although these beliefs change 
over time they will never truly be let go (71 PC). This indoctrination, often into the systems of 
parental figures, is how one's own system of beliefs is molded (74 PC). Outlook is unconsciously 
trained into a person starting at their birth and built up throughout their lives. Outlook determines 
how one encodes and decodes information and as a result what definition of morals will be 
accepted. It’s effect over moral decisions restricts people to the frame of the class they are 
adopted into (75 PC). The pastoral elements present within an organized attitude of complaint 
could be viewed as a means of making those holding an attitude of rejection comfortable with the 
innate impious nature of rejection, as will be discussed more when talking about the satiric 
attitude. An elegiac attitude seeks to redefine what is pious so that the rejection of the traditional 
and dominant views of piety becomes not a true rejection of taught ideals. The desire of the 
rejected frame can instead be seen as an expansion of ideals to cover those left behind by a frame 
of acceptance, those people the elegy places as the bearers of true nobility. An attitude of 
complaint makes its subscribers believe themselves to be crusaders rather than heretics. It serves 
as a way of maintaining the ideas of piety indoctrinated in one since birth but expands those 
ideas so they come to exist within a state of rejection rather than acceptance. This allows the 
differing perspective of the secondary group seeking to alter symbols of authority to appear as 
more acceptable to those holding an attitude of acceptance. It allows for support of these new 
ideas to grow so that a frame will be pushed to its Malthusian limit and be forced to casuistically 
stretch. The elegiac attitude does not actually reject symbols of authority as Burke argues. It 
instead seeks to expand them to a more acceptable form. From Burke's description of the satirical 
attitude a better understanding of the impious nature of rejection can be understood, and more 
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discussion can be had as to if these attitudes really exist in a frame of rejection or a secondary 
frame looking to expand what is accepted within a frame.    
7.2. – Satire 
Burke describes the satirist as someone who attacks in others the weaknesses and 
temptations that are really within himself (49 ATH).  Burke claims that pointing out the innate 
faults within a frame even as they exist within oneself is an active rejection of that frame. Instead 
of internalizing those faults as an attitude related to the epic or tragedy might lead one to do, a 
satirical attitude relates those faults back to the frame itself. Satire as a means of bringing about 
rejection has in recent times become very visible. Some of the most successful shows in 
countering the rhetoric of Trump have approached the topic with a satiric attitude. Shows like the 
Daily Show or Last Week Tonight use satire to point out what they perceive as the ridiculous 
nature of many of Trump's policies. Satire has shown itself in this way to be very effective at 
uncovering the systematic issues that led to Trump in the first place. It allows for a more critical 
conversation of Trump’s rhetoric without the usual fear associated with rejection. 
 In examining the satirical as an attitude of rejection, Burke looks specifically at the 
symbolic parricide involved in the rejection of symbols of authority. In society, the authorities by 
defining God or some similar premise make themselves out to be the owner of God, and as such 
a rejection of societal authority simulates atheism. Burke claims that atheism requires the denial 
of immortality, and implies that if one denies life after death, one can face death with some 
variant of defiance (51 footnote ATH).  Satire awakens one to true consequences, without a fear 
of hell one becomes far more likely to question the church. Hell is just one example of a fear-
based tactic used by powerful institutions to maintain their control, but ideas of the same form 
with the same purpose exist throughout society. These ideas often present themselves in the form 
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of punishment. According to Foucault, when the dominant class takes power, they will put in 
place a system of discipline. Society, Foucault argues, is founded upon disciplinary systems, and 
these systems are maintained through practices of punishment (158). As a dominant class 
cements their position in society, they will put in place structures in order to maintain systems of 
authority, such as the idea of criminality set up by legal codes. The prison system as used by 
governments today parallels the Church's use of hell to keep order among its followers. There is 
a perception that only guilty people go to prison, yet the idea of what guilt is in the first place is 
determined within a frame of acceptance. Prison is hung over people who speak out against the 
order of things as the punishment for their actions and makes them fearful of following such a 
course of action. Punishment maintains the frame of acceptance through its relationship with the 
pleasure principle. Behavior changes after repeat punishment acts upon one's original attitude 
because punishment makes the experience unpleasant (23 ATH). The systems of authority put in 
place by the dominant class work to make the following of the frame of acceptance the only 
option for all classes within a society. As mentioned by Foucault the prison system is not just a 
tool of punishment, but also one of reformation to the frame of acceptance. The prison system is 
built to create docile bodies like that of the training that takes place for military recruits. For one 
to be released from prison and re-enter society they must have condemned their previous actions 
and be willing to now work within the defined system (294). A satirical attitude allows one to 
rise past the fear of prison by understanding its true ideological purpose. Prison is a place to 
house the guilty, but one is not made guilty by being in prison. The fear of prison time although 
still a very real possibility is lost in the satiric attitude because the faults within the system can be 
realized.  
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Satire primes people to see the underpinnings of a frame and realize that its faults are 
fixable, and not just something to be resigned to. It allows people to see past the fear tactics and 
rhetoric of control implemented by dominant societal bodies and opens up possibilities for the 
rejection of their definition for symbols of authority. Burke in his writing on satire uses a quote 
from Jonathon Swift: “everything spiritual and valuable has a gross and revolting parody” 
(Burke quoting Swift 52 ATH). A satirical attitude combats the frames of acceptance because it 
makes clear the gross and revolting parody behind it and provides a new moral reasoning and the 
agency to seek change. Like the elegy the satire works to redefine one’s yearning to conform 
with the sources of their being or their pious beliefs. Within the satiric attitude rejection is no 
longer made to be impious. Instead the bodies of control that attempt to define what is pious is of 
a heretical nature. Satire shows how these bodies do not actually act in relation to what one 
views as pious and opens these organizations up to questioning. 
  Burkes discussion of the satirical attitude validates its role as a means of questioning and 
pushing frames, but that alone is not enough to claim its existence in a frame of rejection. A 
satiric lens does not disavow piety completely; it just challenges the systems behind it. A satiric 
attitude does not exist in a frame of acceptance, but it does not promote the complete rejection of 
that frame’s symbols of authority either. A satiric attitude, like the elegiac, seeks to expand 
symbols of authority in order to correct for the faults associated with them. How the attitude 
interacts with ideas of piety shows that there is still some continuation of the frame of acceptance 
within a satiric attitude. What is considered pious does not necessarily change when one's 
attitudes are satirical in nature; all that changes is one's view of the systems behind the current 
definition of piety. As Burke himself states ideas of piety are adopted from birth and change over 
time to accept new information but never are let go (71 PC). Satire does not magically allow one 
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to let go of these ideas, as would be necessary for true rejection. A satiric attitude instead is just a 
change in one's view of what is pious for them to come to accept symbols of authority. Viewed 
as such the question again arises of whether a satiric attitude like the elegiac is not one of 
rejection but of transition, seeking to expand a frame once it has reached its breaking point rather 
than completely replacing it. Satire awakens ones to the faults of the dominant frame, so that 
they can be fixed. The fixing of a frame though is not a rejection, but much more in line with 
Burke’s idea of a casuistic stretching. Satire cannot bring about true rejection because satire 
attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations that are also within the attacker. This is the 
result of the bureaucratization of the imagination. New values must be morphed to fit within 
others' perspectives. As a result, the ideas supported by a satiric attitude will hold many of the 
same problems within the dominant frame it is questioning. An extension of this frame to face 
those problems does not erase these problems altogether just makes them more acceptable. A 
satiric attitude forces those in power to relinquish some power and reorganize symbols of 
authority but does not destroy them altogether. Expanding symbols of authority to make them 
acceptable to those holding this attitude actually helps in the continuation of a frame. Classes left 
behind might gain some power, but other classes will arise who will still be left out by this new 
system of values. In the end a satiric attitude will lead to a continuation of a frame, just in an 
altered form. As with the two previous attitudes Burke places within the frame of rejection the 
final attitude Burke discusses within this frame, that represented in the burlesque genre, also begs 
the question of whether it inhibits actual rejection of a frame and symbols of authority.   
7.3. – Burlesque 
The burlesque can be understood as style that mocks a subject via an absurd 
representation such as in a polemic or caricature. Unlike a satiric attitude, an attitude of 
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burlesque allows one with that attitude to remain dissociated with the subject. The burlesque 
does not attempt to get inside the psyche of that which it attacks, rather it selects external 
behaviors and drives them to their logical conclusion. Burke calls this action a “reduction to 
absurdity” (53-54 ATH).  By avoiding the intimate description of the opposing force, the 
burlesque avoids the risk of opening up one's own beliefs to their own argument, as is implicit in 
satire. Although the burlesque avoids this one pitfall, in doing so it loses some of its efficacy as 
an attitude that brings about the rejection of symbols of authority. Burke calls the burlesque an 
occasional dish not a piece de resistance (54 ATH). Caricature lacks a well-rounded frame itself. 
It is partisan, which requires it to only be used for the ends of wisdom insofar as ways of making 
allowances for it are provided (55 ATH). The burlesque is held down by its connection to one's 
own frame, because its reliance upon external descriptions. The burlesque as an attitude in 
society will lead to rejection according to Burke, but by itself does not provide the moral 
reasoning for why this rejection needs to take place. The burlesque just attacks the symbols of 
authority within the frame of acceptance, but the biases behind those attacks unless supported by 
good reasons found in other attitudes of rejection can overshadow any actual complaint. The 
burlesque is a heartless poetic, it turns every perhaps into a positively and suppresses mitigating 
circumstances. As much as it can be useful for pointing out the flaws of a frame, these features 
also make it very dangerous as a mode for the creation of new morals (55 ATH).  To overcome 
this Burke says, “we must not be merely equal to it, we must be enough greater than it to be able 
to discount what it says” (55 ATH). The burlesque cannot stand alone to support a frame of 
rejection only in addition to the attitudes of the plaint and satire can it find a good use.  
Burke discusses in detail how an attitude of burlesque attacks symbols of authority, but 
again this by itself does not place the burlesque in a frame of rejection. The burlesque by itself is 
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an attitude that mocks the status quo, but it only dictates certain change as it relates to attitudes 
of complaint and satire. The burlesque seeks change; it points out the flaws in a frame, but it 
does not actually reject the symbols of authority within a frame. Like the elegiac and satirical 
attitude that of the burlesque points out the weaknesses in a frame to bring about transitional 
attitudes that will lead to its expansion. The burlesque seeks to gain popular support of a 
perspective that sees the faults in the positioning of the dominant symbols of authority. This, as 
with the attitudes of the elegy and satire, bring about a frame's Malthusian limit. It brings about 
the need to caustically stretch these symbols of authority to cover those lost by cultural lag but 
does not seek to overturn them. Those in power will be forced to open their ranks and relinquish 
some control, but once this is done those who hold what Burke calls and attitude of rejection will 
be appeased. The dominant frame will be altered, but not rejected.  
8. – Debunking 
To answer the question of whether Burke's attitudes of rejection really are based in 
rejection, it is important to look at an idea prevalent in each of the attitudes, debunking. Burke 
writes that debunking is the “systematic ‘let down’ that matches a systematic ‘build up’” (145 
PLF). He is implying that for any attitude of acceptance there will be an attitude of rejection 
seeking to deflate it. Debunking could also be understood as the same principle that creates 
cultural lag out of class morality. The rise of one class will always lead to the creation of 
opposing classes. Burke in his discussion of debunking finds many characteristics prevalent in its 
practice. He notes that in the act of questioning or debunking an institution there is an innate 
satirism. He writes that a typical debunker will take a strategic approach in order to thoroughly 
discern and eradicate some evil; yet, in searching to be thorough enough the debunker will 
become too thorough and in underpinning his enemies argument will also underpin his own. 
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Satirism is essential to debunking because Burke finds that for one to shatter their opponent’s 
policy, one must adopt a position whereby he could not logically advocate a position of his own 
(147 PLF). The support of this idea traces back to Burke’s original assumption when discussing 
debunking, any systematic build up will be met with a systematic let down. For one to get into a 
place to debunk one must also adjust their own beliefs to gain a more dominant position and be 
able to combat the existing frame. Burke says it is one's ability to pull their own punch by 
refusing to apply their own line of questioning on his ideas that allow one to dissolve the position 
of their opponents and maintain their own.  
The satirical aspect of debunking, the fact that one who can debunk the dominant frame 
must have already adopted part of the dominant position, is a result of the bureaucratic process 
by which ideas spread (225 ATH). This creates a space for one's own frame to be undermined by 
their arguments against the dominant frame and leads to a satirical effect in the case of 
debunking. Burke writes that all orientations hold self-perpetuating qualities that also contain the 
germs of its own dissolution (169 PC). Here a tie can be seen between Burke and Marx. Where 
Marx discusses how the capitalistic frame produces the mechanism of its own downfall, Burke 
applies this idea as something innate in all frames. He writes that new cultural enterprises will be 
built upon the spiritual factors that have already been bureaucratized in an objective and material 
order into society. These factors include things ranging from infrastructure to a grammar of 
thought, and for a new frame to rise it must take possession of this “public equipment” (112 
ATH).  Burke’s ideas on debunking and the transition to frames of rejection seem to contradict 
the idea that these frames really are true rejections of the dominant frame and its symbols of 
authority. 
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  The satirical elements Burke finds in debunking he associates with the reliance of a new 
dominant frame, once a frame of rejection, on the old. Although a new frame might have been 
born out of the rejection of the old symbols of authority in order to gain influence it does not 
actually reject these symbols of authority. Frames that rise up and eventually replace a dominant 
frame are not frames of rejection but are attitudes which seek to expand symbols of authority 
once a frame has reached its Malthusian limit. The curve of history described by Burke is linear, 
history’s progression the result of frames being driven to their Malthusian limit, and constantly 
being expanded to never reach it. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States was a time of 
great change in America, but it is difficult to classify the prevailing attitude behind the policy 
passed and socially enacted from the movement as that of rejection. Martin Luther King Jr. and 
his anti-capitalist, pro-equality rhetoric might be an attitude of rejection, but the message of 
Martin Luther King Jr. as upheld by the movement and remembered today is not one of rejection. 
Since the Civil Rights movement there has been change, but it has not been revolutionary. The 
systematic oppression of all non-white citizens in America is still prevalent, just kept out of the 
public eye to a greater degree. The civil rights movement did not reject the power systems in 
place, just expanded it to cover those who had been previously ignored but who had gained 
enough of a voice to make the dominant powers uncomfortable. The outgroup created by the 
white male dominated system was reaching its limits and had to be broadened for power to be 
held onto even if in the process that power had to be limited slightly. Although this is but one 
example, any social change follows a similar pattern. Even if all previous rulers are thrown out 
and the entire government changes, some hierarchy will remain, symbols of authority will 
remain, the definitions will just have shifted. This is not rejection it is a transition, and it is why 
Burke’s attitudes for the frame of rejection are just other attitudes during transitionary times.  
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9. – Conclusion 
Burke sees the unfolding of history as the shifting between frames by the rejection of 
symbols of authority. He believes that attitudes will arise in people that either accept or reject 
symbols of authority. Through the process of orientation and moral readings of narrative people 
will come to exist in either an attitude of acceptance or rejection. Attitudes of acceptance will 
attempt to maintain symbols of authority. They will resign those holding such an attitude to the 
faults of the current system and try make the rejection of that system extremely unpleasant. The 
institutional systems in place also support these attitudes. Public memory works to limit identity 
and will be defined by the dominant group perspective. This works to limit the creation of new 
values and as a result decreases the pressure of rejectionary forces on attitudes of acceptance. As 
Burke discusses though, his theory of debunking stipulates that for any “systematic ‘build up’” 
there will be a “systematic ‘let down’” (145 PLF). Attitudes of acceptance will create a class that 
benefits from the symbols of authority it defends, but there will also be a cultural lag that creates 
classes ignored and oppressed by the current frame. Burke claims that these classes will come to 
hold an attitude of rejection to the current symbols of authority. As these attitudes gain 
prevalence, they will push a dominant frame to its breaking point or what Burke calls its 
Malthusian limit. As this point is reached transitionary attitudes will appear that seek to subvert 
this transition by casuistically stretching a frame. Burke claims that this stretching can only go so 
far though, and eventually a frame and its symbols of authority will be rejected. He makes this 
claim about the limits of casuistic stretching because Burke approaches history from a wide lens. 
He looks at times of transition as they appear during major ideological shifts. Although he noted 
the slow build up to these shifts, he still sees a distinct shift between frames. By approaching 
Burke’s work on a more micro level and studying the interaction between institutions and 
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individuals this distinct shift becomes much less clear. It becomes apparent that there is no limit 
to casuistic stretching, that there is no real rejection of symbols of authority. Attitudes of 
rejection do not reject symbols of authority, because in order to gain support they must adopt 
some of the position of these symbols of authority. Burke calls this process the bureaucracy of 
the imagination and it requires that new ideas be built upon the structures of the old in order for 
new moral arguments to fulfill what Fisher calls a narrative rationality. Due to this process strict 
process for new idea formation controlled by the dominant class for any change to occur 
attitudes of rejection must seek an expansion of symbols of authority. What attitudes of rejection 
actually do is bring about transitionary forces that expand symbols of authority to make them 
more acceptable to the classes that have arisen that are pushing a frame to its Malthusian limit. 
At this point the dominant class will be forced to relinquish some control, but they will do this 
because the other option is destruction. The dominant class will always choose to stretch 
symbols of authority rather than see them, and the current frame ever truly be destroyed. They 
have the power to do this based upon the nature of their hegemony and the narratological control 
it entails. From these findings it can be determined the frames and symbols of authority have 
been fluid in application but constant throughout history. History is not made up of shifts 
between frames based upon the rejection of symbols of authority, rather it is the slow and 
constant expansion of these symbols of authority and the evolution of the dominant frame as a 
result.  
 The current ideological position of the United States is certainly problematic, but it is not 
new. Although transitional forces feel particularly strong right now, they are always at work. 
That being said, solutions still need to be found that can help propel this country out of the 
quagmire of argument it is stuck in. Although symbols of authority cannot be rejected the role of 
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attitudes of rejection and transition can still work to expand them to better situate the citizens of 
the US. By better understanding the oppressive nature of the symbol systems that bind people 
together people can come to sympathize with those holding other attitudes. By coming to terms 
with our differences we can come together to make things better for everyone.  
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